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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILFRED A. VIGIL JR.,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900166
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26(c), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure whereby a criminal defendant charged
with a first degree felony may appeal an interlocutory order to this
Court after this Court has granted a petition for interlocutory
review.

This Court granted Mr. Vigil's "Petition for Permission to

Appeal from Interlocutory Order" in an order dated June 28, 1990.
See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Can the State charge attempted depraved indifference
homicide?

This issue involves a question of law, and a correction

of error standard applies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State filed a three-count Information against Wilfred
Vigil on July 14, 1989.

R. 6-9.

After the case was bound over to

Third District Court on all three counts, Appellant filed a "Motion
to Dismiss and Amend" on January 11, 1990.

R. 42-44.

On March 23,

1990, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order denying Appellant's motion.
See Addendum B.

R. 74-77.

On April 12, 1990, Appellant filed his "Petition

for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order" in this Court.
R. 87-97.

On June 28, 1990, this Court entered its Order granting

Appellant's request for interlocutory review.
Appellant has been granted a pretrial release and is free
on bail pending the outcome of this appeal and his subsequent trial.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended) is set forth
in pertinent part on page 4 of this brief.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) is set forth
in pertinent part on page 6 of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In a three-count Information, the State charged Mr. Vigil
with one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a
first degree felony, and two counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, a second degree felony.
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R. 6-9.

In Count II of the Information, the State charged
alternatively that Mr. Vigil either "intentionally or knowingly
attempted to cause the death of Shane Hermanson" and/or "acting
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life,
engaged in conduct with created a grave risk of death to another and
thereby attempted to cause the death of Shane Hermansen."

R. 7.

In Count III, the State alleged only that Mr. Vigil,
while "acting under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference
to human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another, and thereby attempted to cause the death of Jeremy
Malloy."
In his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, Mr. Vigil requested
that the trial court amend Count II by deleting the alternative
which is underlined above, and dismiss Count III.
court denied the motion.

R. 74-5.

R. 42. The trial

See Addendum B containing trial

court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Depraved indifference second degree homicide requires a
knowing mental state, not a specific intent to kill.

In order to be

guilty of an attempt, an individual must intend to commit the target
offense, i.e. intend to kill another person.

Since depraved

indifference second degree homicide does not require an intent to
kill another person, attempted depraved indifference homicide is a
legal impossibility.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended) proscribes
Murder in the Second Degree.

It provides:

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, he engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) while in the commission,
attempted commission, or immediate flight
from commission or attempted commission
of . . . , causes the death of another
person other than the party as defined in
Section 76-2-202.
(emphasis added).
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984),
this Court pointed out that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (c) "does
not specify a particular mental state" and that the reference in
that subsection to "'depraved indifference7 does not denote a
subjective mental state."

Instead, the term "depraved indifference"

refers "to the objective circumstances under which the conduct
causing the death occurred."

Id.

Because "depraved indifference second degree murder does
not expressly specify a particular mental state" (Id. at 1045), this
Court looked to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953 as amended) in
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determining the requisite mental state for depraved indifference
murder.

Id. at 1046.

This Court held that the appropriate mental

state for depraved indifference homicide is "knowingly" or with
knowledge.

Id.

This Court stated:

Thus, under our interpretation, the culpable
mental state prescribed by statute for depraved
indifference homicide is the sensible
requirement that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk
of death to another. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1047.
In Fontana, this Court set forth the elements required to
establish depraved indifference under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203(1)(c):
1. The defendant engaged in conduct that
created a grave risk of death to another; and
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another; and
3. The circumstances under which the
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a
reasonable man rather than subjectively by the
actual state of defendant's mind, were such as
to evidence a depraved indifference to human
life; and
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully
caused the death of another.
See also State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Utah 1985).
In Bolsinger, the Court reiterated that the requisite
mens rea for depraved indifference is knowledge that the conduct
created a grave risk of death to another.

Id.

In analyzing the

meaning of the term "depraved indifference," this Court stated:
To constitute depraved indifference, the act
must be done 'which has been rather well
understood at common law to involve something
more serious than mere recklessness alone which
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has had an incidental tragic result.7
(citation omitted). There must be a knowing
doing of an uncalled for act in callous
disregard of its likely harmful effect on a
victim, which is so heinous as to be equivalent
to a "specific intent" to kill. (citation
omitted).
Id. at 1220.
In State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), this
Court again analyzed depraved indifference second degree homicide.
This Court pointed out that the second degree homicide statute deals
with forms of homicide that have a similar, very high degree of
moral culpability.
That culpability arises either from an actual
intent to kill or from a mental state that is
essentially equivalent thereto . . .
Id. at 259.

This Court clarified, however, that depraved

indifference murder does not require a specific intent to kill;
rather, it requires "a knowing doing of an uncalled for
act . . . which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a 'specific
intent' [or a purpose] to kill."

Id. at 261, quoting Bolsinger, 699

P.2d at 1220.
Although depraved indifference murder requires a mental
state that is equivalent to a specific intent to kill, a review of
Utah case establishes that the requisite mens rea is "knowingly,fl
and that a specific intent or purpose to cause the death of another
is not a requirement for depraved indifference homicide.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) outlines the
elements for attempt.

It states in part:
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(1) For purposes of this part a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense, he
engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense."
(emphasis added).
In State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986)
(per curiam), this Court clarified that the elements of attempt
include conduct by the defendant which "constituted a 'substantial
step' toward commission of the offense and that the substantial step
must be 'strongly corroborative' of defendant's intent to commit the
offense.

(footnote omitted)."

(emphasis added).

The emphasized language in both the statute and Harmon
suggests that in order to be convicted of an attempt, the defendant
must intend to commit the target offense.
Utah cases which focus on the crimes of attempted second
degree homicide or attempted manslaughter further demonstrate that a
defendant must have an intent to commit the target offense, i.e. an
intent to kill, in order to commit either crime.
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1989), this
Court held that "attempted felony-murder does not exist as a crime
in Utah."

This Court stated:
The crime of attempted murder does not fit
within the felony-murder doctrine because an
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an
intent to consummate the crime, and numerous
courts have held that the crime of attempted
murder requires proof of intent to kill,
(footnote omitted).
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In Bell, 785 P.2d at 394, this Court also stated:
Indeed, in the face of logic, it is inescapable
that the crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill.
Both State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and
State v, Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), support Mr. Vigil's
argument that an intent to kill is required in order to be guilty of
attempted homicide.

In Norman, 580 P.2d at 240, this Court held

that attempted reckless manslaughter does not exist since the
perpetrator must have an intent to commit the crime in order to be
guilty of an attempt.

In Howell, 649 P.2d at 94, this Court

determined that because subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute
requires an intent to kill, attempt under that subsection is a legal
possibility.
Case law from other jurisdictions also supports
Mr. Vigil's argument that a defendant must intend to kill in order
to be convicted of attempted homicide and that the knowing mental
state required for depraved indifference homicide precludes an
attempted homicide under that subsection.

In reaching the decision

in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, this Court relied on case law
from "two other states with attempt statutes similar to Utah's
[which] have determined that attempted murder requires a specific
intent to kill."
One of those cases, State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me.
1984) did not involve a felony-murder version of homicide; rather,
it involved a knowing mental state.

The Huff court determined that

for a person to be guilty of criminal attempt, he or she must have
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"the intent to complete the target offense."

In other words,

"[b]efore a person can be convicted of attempted murder, he must act
with the intent to cause the death of another human being.
(citation omitted)."

469 A.2d at 1253.

The Huff court pointed out that an actor cannot "intend
to act 'knowingly7" and
That "knowingly" is a distinct and less
purposeful state of mind than
intentionally . . . While either mental state
may satisfy the murder statute, this does not
commend them equally for purposes of the
attempt statute.
Huff. 469 A.2d at 1253.
In People v. Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d 658 (111. App. 1981),
cited by this Court in footnote 13 of State v. Bell. 785 P.2d at
393, the Court stated:
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the
mental state of specific intent to commit
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an
act may result in death or grave bodily injury,
or intent to do bodily harm, is not enough,
(citation omitted).
Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d at 661.

See also State v. Rodaers. 502 A.2d

360, 366 (Conn. 1985) ("The mental state associated with the crime
of attempt to commit murder is 'intent to cause the death of another
person.7"); State v. Strother. 362 So.2d 508, 509 (La. 1978)
(attempted first or second degree murder requires intent to kill
another person); People v. Collie. 634 P.2d 534, 545 (Calif. 1981)
("Specific intent to kill is a necessary element of attempted
murder.").

Although the trial judge was correct that depraved
indifference second degree murder requires a mental state which is
equivalent in moral culpability to a specific intent to kill, he was
incorrect in concluding that attempted depraved indifference
homicide is a legal possibility.

Although the mental states are

"equivalent" in terms of moral culpability, they are distinct in
terms of factual requirements.

Depraved indifference homicide does

not require an actual or specific intent to kill; since the attempt
statute and Utah case law require that an individual intend to
commit the target offense, an attempted depraved indifference
homicide cannot exist.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend,
and remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III
of the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to
delete the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved
indifference homicide.
SUBMITTED this Ntt

day of January, 1991.

feRADSHAW
for Defendant/Appellant

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

N-UL day of January, 1991.

<JlMQ£
JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by
this

day of January, 1991.
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ADDENDUM A

IN T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F UTAH
ooOoo

Regular M a y Term, 1990

June 28, 1990

Tr. - ' J'.dicid District

JUL 0 5 1990
The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wilfred V i g i l ,
Defendant and Appellant,

V ^ & ~--<^^TYx
^i^^^d^^Lf^ id£<l^
No. 900166
Deputy c m
891901033

Appellant's petition for Interlocutory Appeal having
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal be,
and the same is, granted as prayed.
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake Counby Attorney
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL, Bar No. 2039
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84.111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

/-^

MAR 2 3 1990

^MmLi&Jik

isi^cs Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 891901033

v.
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Vigil's
Motion to Dismiss and Amend; the Court heard arguments from counsel
and reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties and being fully
advised, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant

Vigil

is

charged

in Count

II

of

the

Information with Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree,

based,

in

the

alternative,

on

depraved

indifference.

Defendant Vigil is charged with the same offense in Count TTI based
solely on depraved indifference.
2.

Defendant Vigil filed a motion to dismiss Count III

and to dismiss a portion of Count II based on a claim that depraved

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 891901033
Page two

indifference murder does not require a mens rea involving an intent
to kill.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The crime of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in

the Second Degree, under §76-5-203(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended, requires proof of a mens rea which is the equivalent of
a

specific

intent

to

kill

and

which

is

distinguishable

from

recklessness.
2.

Defendant

Vigil's

Motion

to

Dismiss

and

should be denied.
DATED this ^S* — d a y of March, 1990

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:

sc/0077/78159

Amend

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL, Bar No
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

J [ M O J'JvS C.wl ^'JvHiiOl

2039

By.

CSpcty Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 891901033

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Vigil's
Motion to Dismiss and Amend; the Court heard arguments of counsel
and reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties; the Court, having
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED

that Defendant Vigil's

Motion to

Dismiss and Amend is denied.
DATED this ^ ? —day of March, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE RAYMONP r>. HMO
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG*7
Approved as to Form:

sc/0077/78159

State v. Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr.
Case No. 891901033

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this

51

day of March, 1990, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order to NANCY BERGESON, Attorney for
Defendant, at the address stated below.

NANCY BERGESON, ESQ.
Attorney for the Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
sc/0077

